Lowy Institute for International Policy | China-Japan Relations
Overview The Beijing-Tokyo relationship is an important relationship
in the global context. Economically, China and Japan are the second
and third largest economies in the world. Both also possess
significant military capabilities and Japan is an ally of the US, and
hosts US military facilities. However, these countries have long been
uneasy maritime neighbours and in the recent past the bilateral
relationship has been even frostier than usual. Since 2010, a series
of maritime incidents have sullied bilateral political and security
ties. Maritime disputes China and Japan disagree over the
sovereignty of a cluster of islets, known as Senkaku in Japanese or
Diaoyu in Chinese. Tokyo does not recognise the existence of a dispute
over the islands. Japan currently has administrative control over the
islands. In 2010, China accused Japan of changing the status quo with
the arrest of a Chinese fishing vessel captain after the fishing
vessel rammed a Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the islands . Beijing
also sees the Japanese Government's purchase of some of the islands
from their private owner in 2012 as a provocative action. In return,
Japan is unhappy with increased patrols by Chinese maritime
enforcement fleets. Tokyo is displeased with an incident in 2013 where
a Chinese naval vessel reportedly locked its fire control radar onto a
nearby Japanese vessel. In 2013 Beijing also announced an Air Defence
Identification Zone (ADIZ), requiring all civilian and military
aircraft to identify themselves when flying within a defined zone that
extended beyond China's maritime territory. There was a lack of
consultation before the announcement according to the Japanese side.
Also the ADIZ included disputed areas such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands and another land feature that is part of a dispute between
China and South Korea. Beijing does point out that other countries
also have ADIZs. Despite this concerning trend of confrontational
events, it should be noted that since late 2013 Chinese maritime
patrols in the waters around the Senkakus/Diaoyus have become less
frequent and more predictable, lessening the chance of an accidental
incident near the islands. Frosty relations between China and Japan -
although quite distinct from another maritime sovereignty dispute
involving China in the South China Sea - have recently become more
regional in nature with the US, Japan and others calling for a
rules-based approach to maritime incidents. These comments, either
explicitly or implicitly, are directed at a more assertive and capable
Chinese maritime presence. Beijing, for its part, has described this
as a provocation. Historical issues There are historical issues
from Japan's occupation of parts of China during the 20th century that
still remain unresolved today. Beijing feels that Japan has not atoned
for its occupation and aggressive actions in the second World War.
Also, visits by Japanese leaders, most recently by Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe, to the Yasukuni Shrine which houses 14 Class A war
criminals elicit a sharp rebuke from Beijing. The Korean Peninsula
The Korean Peninsula also plays a role in China-Japan relations. South
Korea, like Japan, is a US ally but this does not mean the two are the
friendliest of neighbours. Their relationship, as with Beijing-Tokyo
ties, is weighed down with historical baggage. This inhibits
three-way programs such as negotiations for a trilateral free trade
agreement between China, Japan and South Korea. Japan, the US and
South Korea also have a common interest in seeing a more predictable
North Korea. All three, including Japan, would like China to play a
more proactive role in stopping North Korean missile tests (which in
the past have travelled over Japanese territory), nuclear tests and
border skirmishes. There is a perception in Japan that China is the
only external nation that can influence North Korean actions.
What the Lowy Institute does The Lowy Institute has strong depth in
Japan and China expertise, with International Security Program
Director Euan Graham, East Asia Program Director Merriden Varrall,
and Nonresident Fellows Murray McLean AO, Linda
Jakobson and Malcom Cook all specialising on China or Japan. Other
analysts such as Nonresident Fellow Rory Medcalf provide regional
security and maritime context to this most important of relationships.
There is also regular expert commentary analysing the China-Japan
relationship on the Lowy Interpreter.